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Abstract. Several reliability engineering approaches have been proposed to 
identify and recover from failures. A well-known and mature approach is the 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) method that is usually utilized 
together with Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to analyze and diagnose the causes of 
failures. Unfortunately, both approaches seem to have primarily focused on 
failures of hardware components and less on software components. Moreover, 
for utilizing FMEA and FTA very often an existing implementation of the 
system is required to perform the reliability analysis. We propose extensions to 
FMEA and FTA to utilize them for the reliability analysis of software at the 
architecture design level. We present the software architecture reliability 
analysis approach (SARAH) that incorporates the extended FMEA and FTA. 
The approach is illustrated using an industrial case for analyzing reliability of 
the software architecture of a Digital TV. 
Keywords: reliability analysis, FMEA, FTA, software architecture evaluation. 
1   Introduction 
A number of important trends can be observed in the development of embedded 
systems. First, due to the high industrial competition and the advances in hardware 
and software technology, there is a continuous demand for products with more 
functionality. Second, the functionality provided by embedded systems is shifting 
from hardware to software. Third, the functionality of embedded systems is not solely 
developed by just one manufacturer only but it is host to multiple parties. Finally, 
embedded systems are more and more integrated in networked environments that 
affect these systems in ways that might not have been foreseen during their 
construction. Altogether, these trends complicate the design and implementation of 
embedded systems. As a result, major steps in technology are required to keep the 
reliability [2] of these systems at the current level. Obviously, since embedded 
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systems are now largely defined and controlled by software, it is also expected that 
the software failures form a major threat for reliability. Therefore, appropriate 
reliability analysis and design techniques should be provided to support the 
anticipation and prevention of potential failures. 
In the literature, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) together with Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) are well-known and mature approaches to identify failure modes 
of system components and evaluate their impact on the system reliability. It appears 
though that these approaches have primarily focused on failures in hardware 
components and less on software components. In fact this is not so strange because 
historically, software formed only a small part of embedded systems and as such 
hardware components primarily defined the quality of the system. The developments 
and trends in embedded systems have provided an increasing awareness that 
reliability analysis should not be limited to hardware components but should also 
cover software components [6,7,15,16,21]. Further, for applying FMEA and FTA 
very often a running system is required and less focus has been given to reliability 
analysis before the system is actually implemented. However, it is of importance to 
analyze the failures earlier in the life cycle, at the software architecture design level. 
In this way, potential risks can be identified earlier, before committing organizational 
resources for implementing the system. 
Obviously, FMEA and FTA have provided their clear merits for reliability analysis 
and it is worthwhile to extend and integrate these mature approaches in reliability 
analysis for software components. Hence, we propose extensions to FMEA and FTA 
and integrate them in our novel software architecture reliability analysis method 
(SARAH). Hereby, we first construct a failure domain model by analyzing the 
domain of failures and the relevant categories. The failure domain model is utilized to 
derive general failure scenarios that can be defined as possible types of failures. 
Failure scenarios are described using (adapted) FMEA worksheets. The prioritization 
of failure scenarios is different from the conventional use of FMEA and FTA where 
safety has been usually the main criteria for prioritizing failure scenarios. In the 
industrial project that we are working in [19], we focus on the consumer electronics 
domain, where safety is less or not an issue. Instead, it is the perception of the user for 
a failure that defines the severity of that failure. Therefore, we prioritize the failure 
scenarios based on their severity from the end-user perspective. Failure scenarios are 
then utilized to derive a Fault Tree Set (FTS), which shows the causal and logical 
connections among the failures. FTS is used to perform severity analysis, in which we 
measure the impact and contribution of the other failures to the user perceived 
failures. In FTA, severity analysis uses the probabilities of failure occurrences [6] that 
are usually obtained from an already developed system. We introduce an impact 
model to estimate the overall impact of a failure even if the probability values are not 
known. To sum up, the extensions that we propose for FMEA and FTA relate to using 
a failure domain model for systematic derivation of failures, the prioritization of 
failure scenarios based on user perception, and finally an impact analysis model for 
FTA that does not explicitly require a running system. The extended approaches are 
utilized to perform sensitivity analysis, where we identify the sensitive components of 
the architecture. These are the components that are associated with the most severe 
failures. SARAH results in a failure analysis report that defines the sensitive 
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components of the architecture and provides information on the type of failures that 
might happen frequently. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the 
background information on conventional FMEA and FTA methods. In Section 3, we 
give an overview of the analysis method. In Section 4, we present the industrial case, 
in which software architecture for a Digital TV is introduced. This example will be 
used throughout the paper to illustrate the steps of SARAH and to discuss our 
experiences in the industrial context. Section 5 presents the specification and 
derivation of the failure scenarios. In section 6, severity analysis based on fault trees 
is explained. Section 7 presents the analysis of the architecture. Section 8 provides the 
related work. Finally, in Section 9 we provide the conclusions. 
2   FMEA and FTA 
FMEA [17] is a well-known and mature approach for reviewing the causes and effects 
of system failures systematically. The basic operations of the method are 1) to 
question the ways that each component fails (failure modes) and 2) to consider the 
reaction of the system to these failures (effects). The analysis results are organized by 
means of a worksheet, which comprises information about each failure mode, its 
causes, its local and global effects (concerning other parts of the product and the 
environment), the associated component and its severity. A simplified FMEA 
worksheet template is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1.  An example FMEA worksheet based on MIL-STD-1629A [12] 
System: Car Engine 
Date: 10-10-2000 
Compiled by: J. Smith 
Approved by: D. Green 
ID Item ID Failure Mode Failure Causes Failure Effects 
Severity 
Class 
1 CE5 fails to 
operate 
Motor shorted Motor overheats 
and burns V 
2 … … … … … 
 
FMEA can be employed for risk assessment and for discovering potential single-
point failures. Systematic analysis increases the insight in the system and the analysis 
results can be used for guiding the design, its evaluation and improvement. At the 
downside, some failure modes can be overlooked [14] and some information (e.g. 
failure probability, risk) regarding the failure modes can be incorrectly estimated at 
early design phases. Since the technique focuses on individual components at a time, 
combined effects and coordination failures can also be missed. In addition, FMEA 
process is effort and time consuming. 
FMEA is usually applied together with FTA. FTA [6] is based on a graphical 
model (fault tree), which defines causal relationships between faults (a set of example 
fault trees can be seen in Figure 5). Faults, which are assumed to be provided, are 
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defined as undesirable system states or events that can lead to a system failure. The 
top node (i.e. root) of the fault tree represents the system failure and the leaf nodes 
represent faults. The nodes of the fault tree are interconnected with logical connectors 
(e.g. AND, OR gates) that infer propagation and contribution of faults to the failure. 
Once the fault tree is constructed, it can be processed in a bottom-up manner to 
calculate the probability that a failure would take place. This calculation is done based 
on the probabilities of fault occurrences and interconnections between the faults and 
the failure [6]. Additionally, the tree can be processed in a top-down manner for 
diagnosis to determine the potential faults that may cause the failure. 
3   Industrial Case: Digital TV (DTV) Software Architecture 
At the Embedded Systems Institute (ESI, Netherlands), the TRADER (Television 
Related Architecture and Design to Enhance Reliability) project is carried out 
together with NXP Semiconductors and several other academic and industrial partners 
[19]. The objective of the project is to develop methods and tools for ensuring 
reliability of digital television (DTV) sets. Due to the increasing size and complexity 
of software that is embedded in TVs, in practice, it is not feasible to design a perfect 
system that is fault-free. To cope with the faults that cannot be detected, appropriate 
fault tolerance mechanisms are required. In the DTV design in the TRADER project, 
faults of which effects can be directly observed by the user require a special attention. 
Such faults are considered to be important and they should be tolerated. Because 
TRADER aims to anticipate also on faults in future releases, it is also important that 
reliability analysis techniques are defined at the design level. From this perspective 
one of the key aims in TRADER is the design of fault tolerant software architecture 
with respect to the perception of TV users. 
A conceptual architecture of DTV is depicted in Figure 1, which will be referred to 
throughout the paper. Figure 1(a) presents a module view [4] of the whole DTV 
structure with implementation units and direct dependencies among them. It mainly 
comprises two layers. The bottom layer, namely the streaming layer, involves 
modules taking part in streaming of audio/video information. The upper layer consists 
of application-related and utility modules that control the streaming process. Figure 
1(b) presents a view of the streaming layer in pipe-and-filter style [4]. The streaming 
layer modules shown in Figure 1(a) correspond to the streaming layer components in 
Figure 1(b) with the same names. 
In the following, we briefly explain some of the important modules and 
components that are shown in the architecture. For brevity, the components for 
decoding and processing audio/video signals are not explained here. 
Application Manager (AMR) initiates and controls execution of both resident and 
downloaded applications in the system. It keeps track of application states, user 
modes and redirects commands/information to specific applications or controllers 
accordingly. Audio Controller (AC), controls audio features like volume level, bas 
and treble based on commands received from AMR. Command Handler (CH) 
interprets externally received signals (i.e. through keypad or remote control) and 
sends corresponding commands to AMR. Communication Manager (CMR) employs 
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«subsystem»
Command Handler
«subsystem»
Application Manager
«subsystem»
Program Manager
«subsystem»
Program Installer
«subsystem»
Content Browser
«subsystem»
Teletext
«subsystem»
EPG
«subsystem»
Graphics Controller
«subsystem»
Last State Manager
«subsystem»
C/A
«subsystem»
Audio Controller
«subsystem»
Video Controller
«subsystem»
Tuner
«subsystem»
Video Processor
«subsystem»
Data Decoder & Interpreter
«subsystem»
Audio Processor
«subsystem»
Graphics
«subsystem»
Audio Out
«subsystem»
Video Out
«subsystem»
Communication Manager
Control Layer
Streaming Layer
Module Dependency (uses)KEY «subsystem»Layer
 
(a) Module View of the Digital TV Architecture 
 
 
(b) Component-Connector View (pipe-and-filter style) of the Streaming Layer 
Fig. 1. Conceptual Architecture of a Digital TV 
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protocols for providing communication with external devices. Conditional Access 
(C/A) authorizes information that is presented to the user. Content Browser (CB) 
presents and provides navigation of content residing in a connected external device. 
Electronic Program Guide (EPG) presents and provides navigation of electronic 
program guide. Graphics Controller (GC) is responsible for generation of graphical 
images corresponding to user interface elements. Last State Manager (LSMR) keeps 
track of last state of user preferences such as the volume level and the selected 
program. Program Installer (PI) searches and registers programs together with the 
channel information (e.g. frequency). Program Manager (PM) tunes to a specific 
channel. Teletext (TXT) handles acquisition, interpretation and presentation of the 
teletext pages. Video Controller (VC) controls the video features like scaling of the 
video frames based on commands received from AMR. 
4   Fundamental Steps of the Analysis Method 
Software architecture forms one of the key artifacts in the software development life 
cycle since it embodies the earliest design decisions and includes the gross-level 
components that directly impact the subsequent analysis, design and implementation. 
Accordingly, it is important that the architecture design supports the required qualities 
of the software system. In general static analysis of formal architectural models is 
applied or a set of architecture analysis methods as described in [5] are used to 
analyze and predict the quality of the system. In this paper, we focus on software 
architecture analysis methods that utilize scenarios for evaluating architectures. In 
general, these analysis methods take as input the architecture design and measure the 
impact of predefined scenarios on it to identify the potential risks and the sensitive 
points of the architecture. This helps to predict the quality of the system before it is 
built, thereby reducing unnecessary maintenance costs. A scenario is considered to be 
a brief description of some anticipated or desired use of the system. 
We propose a scenario-based architecture analysis method, SARAH that 
incorporates FMEA and FTA. In contrast to general-purpose architectural analysis 
methods in which scenarios can refer to different quality factors, we utilize the notion 
of failure scenario to analyze the impact of failures. A failure scenario represents the 
possible occurrence of a failure in a given component. The steps of SARAH are 
presented in a UML activity diagram in Figure 2. The approach consists of two basic 
processes: (1) Definition (2) Analysis. 
  
Fig. 2. The Steps of the Analysis Method 
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In the definition process, first the software architecture is described (section 3). 
Failure scenarios are then derived from a failure domain model that includes a 
categorization of failures. Failure scenarios are described using a template like FMEA 
worksheet (section 5). As a subsequent step the failure scenarios in the FMEA are 
utilized in the FTA (section 6).  Here, we introduce the Fault Tree Set (FTS) concept, 
which is basically a set of possibly connected fault trees. We use an impact model 
based on FTS to estimate the impact of a failure scenario on the occurrence of the 
user-perceived failures. By combining the impact model together with the failure 
prioritization, we measure the severity of a failure scenario based on the type of user-
perceived failures it can lead to and its contribution on the occurrence of these 
failures. Section 6 describes in detail our analysis based on fault trees. 
Based on the input from the definition process, in the analysis process, an 
architectural level analysis (section 7.1) and a component level analysis (section 7.2) 
is performed. The results are presented in the failure analysis report (section 8). In the 
following sections the main steps of the method will be explained in detail using the 
industrial case study. 
5   Specification and Derivation of Failure Scenarios 
In this section we define the process for deriving and specifying failure scenarios. 
Section 5.1 introduces the scenario template that is used for describing failure 
scenarios. Section 5.2 explains the derivation of the failure domain model, which 
provides a categorization for failure scenarios. Section 5.3 explains the derivation of 
general failure scenarios. Finally, Section 5.4 explains the derivation of concrete 
failure scenarios based on general failure scenarios. 
5.1   Failure Scenario Template 
We define the concept of failure scenario to analyze the architecture with respect to 
reliability. Reliability is the ability of the system to function without a failure, which 
is as an event that occurs when the delivered service of a system deviates from a 
correct service [2]. A correct service is delivered when the service implements the 
required system function. An error is defined as the system state that may lead to a 
failure and the cause of an error is called a fault [2]. Figure 3 depicts the fundamental 
chain of threats that leads to a failure. 
  
Fig. 3. The Fundamental Chain of Reliability Threats Leading to a Failure 
A failure scenario specification includes a description of the fault, the error and the 
failure (See Table 2). Additionally, the failure ID is used to uniquely identify a 
scenario and the component ID defines the component for which the failure scenario 
applies. Note that this template is similar to the FMEA worksheet (See Table 1). To 
specify failure scenarios, we use FID, CID, fault, error and failure instead of the 
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Table 2.  Template for Defining the Failure Scenarios 
Attribute Explanation 
FID A numerical value to identify the failures (i.e. Failure ID). 
CID An acronym defining the component for which the failure 
scenario applies (i.e. Component ID). 
Fault The description and the features of the cause of the error. 
Error The description and the features of the component state that leads to the failure. 
Failure The description and the features of the deviation of the 
component function from the required function. 
concepts failure ID, related component, failure cause, failure mode and failure effect, 
respectively. 
5.2   Derivation of the Failure Domain Model 
The failure scenario template can be used to describe scenarios. However, there exist 
too many fault, error and failure types that can be considered. Hence, there is a high 
risk that several potential and relevant failure scenarios are missed or that other 
irrelevant failure scenarios are included. To define the relevant failures SARAH 
defines relevant domain model for faults, errors and failures using a systematic 
domain analysis process. This domain model provides a first scoping of the potential 
scenarios. In fact, several researchers have already focused on modeling and 
classifying failures for embedded systems. Avizienis et al [2], for example, provide a 
nice overview of this related work and provide a comprehensive classification of 
faults, errors and failures. The provided domain classification by Avizienis et al., 
however, is rather broad1, and one can assume that for a given reliability analysis 
project not all the potential failures in this overall domain are relevant. Therefore, the 
given domain is further contracted by focusing only on the faults, errors and failures 
that are considered relevant for the actual project. Figure 4, for example, defines the 
derived domain model that is considered relevant for the DTV project. Figure 4 
includes three feature diagrams that depict a categorization for faults, errors and 
failures. 
In the feature diagram of fault (see Figure 4), faults are identified according to their 
source, dimension and persistence. In SARAH, failure scenarios are defined per 
component. For that reason, the source of the fault can be either (1) internal to the 
component in consideration, (2) caused by other component(s) of the system or (3) 
caused by the external entities with respect to the system. Faults can be introduced by 
software or hardware, and be transient or persistent. The relevant features of an error 
comprise the type of error together with its detectability and reversibility properties. 
The features for failure include the type and the target. The target of a failure can be 
the user or the other component(s) of the system.  
                                                          
1
  Due to space limitations we do not show this domain model and refer the interested reader to 
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Fault Dimension
Source
Persistence
internal (w.r.t. component)
external (w.r.t.  system)
hardware
software
permanent
transient
other component(s)
Error Detectability
Type
Reversibility
data corruption
wrong value
detectable
undetectable
irreversible
reversible
deadlock
out of resources
too early/late
wrong execution path
Failure
Target
Type
user
other component(s)
timing
presentation quality
behavior
wrong value/presentation legend mandatory 
feature
alternative 
feature
 
Fig. 4. Failure Domain Model: Classification of (relevant) Faults, Errors and Failures 
In principle, for different project requirements one may come up with a slightly 
different domain model, but as we will show in the next sections this does not impact 
the steps in the analysis method itself. The key issue here is that the failure domain 
model is derived in accordance with the project requirements and the elements of a 
failure scenario are defined as instances of this model. 
5.3   Derivation of the General Failure Scenarios 
The domain model defines a system-independent specification of the type of faults, 
error and failures that could occur and is utilized for deriving so-called general failure 
scenarios2. A general failure scenario is a system-independent failure scenario that 
includes selected sub-features from the fault, error and failure features. The number 
and type of general failure scenarios is implicitly defined by the failure domain 
model.  
In the fault classification (see Figure 4), for example, we can define faults based on 
three features, namely Source, Dimension and Persistence. The feature Source can 
                                                          
2
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Bachmann et al. [3]. 
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have 3 different values, the features Dimension and Persistence 2 values. This means 
that the fault classification captures 3×2×2 = 12 different faults. Similarly, from the 
error classification we can derive 6x2x2 = 24 different errors, and 4x2 = 8 different 
failures are captured by the failure classification. Since a general scenario is a 
composition of selection of features from the failure domain model, we can state that 
for the given failure domain model in Figure 4, 12x8x24 = 2304 general failure 
scenarios can be in principle defined. One of these general failure scenarios is, for 
example, shown in Table 3. 
Table 3.  Example General Failure Scenario Derived from the Failure Domain Model 
Fault Error Failure 
source: internal 
dimension: software 
persistence: transient  
type: too early/late 
detectability: detectable 
reversibility: irreversible 
type: timing 
target: user 
5.4   Derivation of the Concrete Failure Scenarios 
Although general failure scenarios provide an indication of possible failure scenario 
types, these do not reflect instantiated real failure scenarios. For example, the failure 
scenario specified in Table 3 does not specify the associated component, the actual 
fault, the error and the failure. SARAH includes additional steps to identify the 
relevant failure scenarios and to change the general failure scenarios to concrete 
failure scenarios. Unlike general failure scenarios, the concrete failure scenarios 
relate to specific components in the architecture. The steps for deriving concrete 
failure scenarios include (1) analyzing the domain (2) analyzing problems of existing 
systems, and (3) consulting domain experts. We can illustrate this for the adopted 
example case on the DTV architecture. 
In the first step, we have analyzed the domain on corresponding digital TVs, 
including requirements specifications, design documentation of existing systems, 
literature on digital TV systems and real-time embedded systems. 
In the second step, we have made use of the available DTV Problem Database 
(PRDB) that had been developed to report on failures of earlier TV systems. The 
primary goal of PRDB by recording failures was to solve the existing problems in 
current TV sets and not to support the analysis of the system. This had a clear impact 
on the PRDB. First of all, the reported problems were not in the format that we 
required, and we had to interpret these first. Further, the PRDB also included outdated 
information and we had to filter these out. Some problems were related to concrete 
and older products but since existing TV systems share common properties with next 
generation products, they have to cope with similar type of failures. For example, out-
of-spec signal is a typical fault leading to numerous errors in extraction of Teletext 
information. Usually, specific instances of this type of fault have been reported in 
PRDB and appropriate solutions were provided.  However, in general, reception of 
out-of-spec signals can pop up as a problem for every new TV system. By collecting 
such regular problems we could derive useful failure scenarios. Despite of the 
problems that we encountered in analyzing this PRDB it definitely provided valuable 
input. 
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Finally, in the last step for deriving concrete failure scenarios we have consulted 
digital TV domain experts to derive additional scenarios and to cross-validate the 
previously identified scenarios. 
Based on these steps, we have derived and specified 44 concrete failure scenarios 
for the reliability analysis of the DTV. As an example, Table 4 presents a list of nine 
selected concrete failure scenarios that have been derived. In Table 4 the five 
attributes failure ID, component ID, fault, error and failure are represented as 
columns headings. Failure scenarios are represented in rows.  The failure ID (FID) 
does not imply a specific ordering but it is only used to identify the concrete failure 
scenarios. The column component ID (CID) includes acronyms of component names 
from Figure 1 to which the identifiers refer. Note that the separate features of the 
failure domain model are represented as keywords in the cells. For example, Fault 
includes the features source, dimension and persistence as defined in Figure 4. Such 
features are represented as keywords, which distinguish the fault, error and failure 
categories. For example, failure scenario F5 indicates a permanent fault (wrong 
implementation of a protocol). It leads to a timing error since a communicating party 
can not receive an expected response on time. This error turns out to be a failure that 
leads to a transient fault in F2 because the communication temporarily ceases. We 
consider timing errors as irreversible whereas a wrong value, for instance, can be 
rolled back (reversible). Apart from the different features, every column also includes 
the keyword description, which is used to denote the domain specific details of the 
concrete failure scenarios. Typically these descriptions are derived from domain 
experts.  
6   Fault Tree Set and Severity Analysis 
A close analysis of the failure scenarios in Table 4 shows that they are connected to 
each other. The columns Fault and Failure include the fields source and target 
respectively. These fields represent the propagation and the links between failure 
scenarios. For example, in failure scenario F2, the fault source is defined as 
CMR(F5), indicating that the fault in F2 occurs due to a failure in component CMR as 
defined in F5. The source of the fault can be caused by a combination of failures. This 
is expressed by logical connectives. For example, the source of F1 is defined as 
CH(F4) OR CMR(F6) indicating that F1 occurs due to a failure in component CH as 
defined in F4 or due to a failure in component CMR as defined in F6. To make all 
these connections explicit, in SARAH fault trees are defined. A fault tree is a model 
for representing the cause-effect relations of failures and faults. The root of a fault 
tree represents a failure and the leaf nodes represent faults. Since a failure can be 
logically caused by a set of faults, the nodes of the fault tree are interconnected with 
logical connectors. 
Normally, a fault tree has one root (top) node, which represents the failure of the 
system. However, a system may fail in many different ways each of which has a 
different effect (i.e. annoyance caused) on the user. For example, a failure can be 
transient, permanent or catastrophic. A failure scenario can contribute to one or more 
user perceived failures. Hence, we define a Fault Tree Set (FTS) based on a given set 
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Table 4.  Selected Failure Scenarios Derived for the DTV Architecture 
FID CID Fault Error Failure 
F1 AMR 
description: Reception of 
irrelevant signals.  
source: CH(F4) OR CMR(F6) 
dimension: software  
persistence: transient 
description: Working mode is 
changed when it is not desired.  
type: wrong path  
detectability: undetectable  
reversibility: reversible 
description: Switching to an 
undesired mode.  
type: behavior 
target: user 
F2 AMR 
description: Can not acquire 
information.  
source: CMR(F5)  
dimension: software  
persistence: transient 
description: Information can not be 
acquired from the connected device. 
type: too early/late  
detectability: detectable  
reversibility: irreversible 
description: Can not provide 
information. 
type: timing 
target: CB(F3)  
F3 CB 
description: Can not acquire 
information.  
source: AMR(F2)  
dimension: software  
persistence: transient 
description: Information can not be 
presented due to lack of information. 
type: too early/late  
detectability: detectable  
reversibility: irreversible 
description: Can not present 
content of the connected 
device. 
type: behavior 
target: user  
F4 CH 
description: Software fault.  
source: internal  
dimension: software  
persistence: permanent 
description: Signals are interpreted in 
a wrong way.  
type: wrong value  
detectability: undetectable  
reversibility: reversible 
description: Provide irrelevant 
information. 
type: wrong value/presentation
target: AMR(F1)  
F5 CMR 
description: Protocol 
mismatch. 
source: external  
dimension: software  
persistence: permanent 
description: No communication with 
the connected device.  
type: too early/late  
detectability: detectable  
reversibility: irreversible 
description: Can not provide 
information. 
type: timing 
target: AMR(F2)  
F6 CMR 
description: Software fault.  
source: internal  
dimension: software  
persistence: permanent 
description: Signals are interpreted in 
a wrong way.  
type: wrong value  
detectability: undetectable  
reversibility: reversible 
description: Provide irrelevant 
information.  
type: wrong value/presentation
target: AMR(F1) 
F7 DDI 
description: Out-of-spec 
signals.  
source: external  
dimension: software  
persistence: transient 
description: Scaling information can 
not be interpreted from meta-data.  
type: wrong value  
detectability: detectable  
reversibility: reversible 
description: Can not provide 
data.  
type: wrong value/presentation
target: IC(F8) 
F8 IC 
description: Inaccurate 
scaling ratio information.  
source: DDI(F7) AND 
VC(F9)  
dimension: software  
persistence: transient 
description: Video image can not be 
scaled appropriately.  
type: wrong value  
detectability: undetectable  
reversibility: reversible 
description: Provide distorted 
video image.  
type: presentation quality 
target: user  
F9 VC 
description: Software fault.  
source: internal  
dimension: software  
persistence: permanent 
description: Wrong scaling ratio 
calculation.  
type: wrong value  
detectability: detectable  
reversibility: reversible 
description: Provide inaccurate 
information.  
type: wrong value/presentation 
target: IC(F8) 
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of failure scenarios. Here, we introduce a set of definitions related to FTS, which will 
be further used in the remainder of the paper. FTS is a graph G(V,E) with the 
following properties: 
 
1. V = F ∪ A 
2. F is the set of failure scenarios each of which is associated with an architectural 
component. 
3. Fu ⊆ F is the set of failure scenarios comprising failures that are perceived by the 
user (i.e. system failures). Vertices residing in this set constitute root nodes of fault 
trees. 
4. A is the set of gates representing the logical connectors. 
5. ∀ g ∈ A,  
 outdegree(g) = 1 ∧ 
 indegree(g) ≥ 1 
6. A = AAND ∪ AOR such that,  
 AAND is the set of AND gates, 
 AOR is the set of OR gates. 
7. E is the set of directed edges (u, v)  
where u, v ∈ V. 
 
For the example case, based on the failure scenarios in Table 4 we can derive the 
FTS as depicted in Figure 5. 
 
Fig. 5. Fault Trees Derived from the Failure Scenarios in Table 4 
Here, the FTS consists of three fault trees. On the left the fault tree shows that F1 is 
caused by F4 or F6. The middle column indicates that failure scenario F3 is caused by 
F2 which is on its turn caused by F5. Finally, in the last column the fault tree shows 
that F8 is caused by both F7 and F9. 
In conventional FMEA and FTA, every fault is assigned a severity value to denote 
how severe a fault is (e.g. faulty component can be repaired or not). In our model, we 
take a user-centric approach and define severity based on the user-perception. We 
assign severities to all failures based on their impact on the user. System failures that 
we consider are not restricted to complete crash-down of the system. For instance, a 
minor distortion in the brightness level of the video image and absence of any image 
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are both failures. However, the impact on the user perception for both failures is 
different. For example, a complete black screen will upset the user more than a 
temporary distortion in the image. 
Severities based on user perception can be only defined for user perceived failures 
(elements of the set Fu). We need to propagate these severity values to the other 
failures (elements of the set F) as well. For this, we need to consider the impact of 
such intermediate failures to the user perceived failures. In conventional FTA, this 
impact is known as the sensitivity of the system failure (i.e. user perceived failure) 
with respect to a fault (i.e. intermediate failure). Sensitivity analysis is based on cut-
sets in a fault tree and the probability values of fault occurrences [6]. However, this 
analysis leads to complex formulas and it requires that the probability values are 
known priori. We propose the following impact model by means of which one can 
reason about and estimate the overall impact of a failure even if the probability values 
are not known. 
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In equation (1) above, the impact calculation of an intermediate failure (node) on a 
user-perceived failure (root) is presented. The probability of occurrence of root 
(P(root)) is represented in terms of the occurrence probabilities of all other nodes as it 
is done in FTA [6]. For example, the following probabilities can be defined for user-
perceived failures considering the fault trees presented in Figure 5: P(F1) = P(F4) + 
P(F6) – (P(F4) × P(F6)), P(F3) = P(F2) = P(F5), P(F8) = P(F7) × P(F9). We 
assign p’ to the probability of occurrence of node and fix the probability values of all 
other nodes to p in P(root). Thus P(root) turns out to be a function of p and p’. 
Recalling the example in Figure 6 again, if we are interested in impact of F4 on F1, 
we transform P(F1) to P(F1) = p’ + p – (p’ × p). Then, we take a partial derivation of 
P(root) with respect to p’. This gives the rate of change of P(root) with respect to p’. 
For our example, this will yield to ∂/∂p’P(F1) = 1 – p. Finally, the result of the partial 
derivation is integrated with respect to p for all possible probability values ([0-1]) to 
calculate the overall impact. For the example case, ∫(∂/∂p’P(F1))dp = ∫(1 – p)dp = p – 
p2/2. So, the result of the integration from 0 to 1 will be 0,5. When the probability 
values are known, they can be included in the model instead of fixing them to p and 
ranging them from 0 to 1. The basic shortcoming of this model is the equality 
assumption for the probability values that are fixed to p. There exist similar 
approaches in the literature where sensitivity/impact analyses are applied by changing 
a parameter one at a time and fixing the others [7, 21]. However, such analyses are 
applied for a specific architecture and the associated fault tree without providing a 
generic model. In those studies, basically the parameters are varied and results 
obtained from the reliability model are observed to assess the sensitivity. 
Combining the impact model introduced above together with the severity degrees 
assigned to the user perceived failures leads us to the following severity model, which 
assigns severity to each node of a fault tree. 
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(2) 
In equation (2), severity(root) gives the severity of a user-perceived failure. This 
can be based on a set of values in ordinal scale that defines user annoyance levels or it 
can be based on a more sophisticated model. The severity of other failure 
(severity(node)) is calculated based on the impact model introduced in equation (1) 
and the severity values assigned to the user perceived failures they lead to. As a result, 
the severity of a failure depends on the type of failures it leads to and to how much it 
contributes (the impact) to these failures. Note in equation (2) that if there is no 
connection between node and a root∈Fu in the fault tree, then the result of the partial 
derivation and hence the whole severity calculation will yield to 0 (since there will be 
no term in the function with p’ as the multiplier). 
For the analysis presented in this paper, we adopt a simpler model for propagation 
of severity values. As a diversion from the usual approach, we process the fault trees 
in a top-down manner to assign severities to intermediate failures based on severities 
of user-perceived failures. Given the FTS, the calculation of severities of failure 
scenarios can be defined as follows. 
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(3) 
In the first part of the equation, we take into account the failure scenarios with the 
target user. A severity value (su) is assigned for each such failure based on their 
severities with respect to the user-perception. These are the failures F1, F3 and F8. 
We apply a prioritization of the failure scenarios based on the severity values that 
range from 1 to 5 (See Table 5). 
Table 5.  The Severity Levels for the Prioritization of Failure Scenarios 
Severity Type Annoyance Description 
1. Very low User hardly perceives failure. 
2. low A failure is perceived but not really annoying. 
3. moderate Annoying performance degradation is perceived. 
4. high User perceives serious loss of functions. 
5. very high Basic functions fail. System locks up and does not respond. 
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The severity values for failures F1, F3 and F8 are depicted in Figure 6. These 
values are then used in order to determine the severities of other failures as shown in 
the second part of the equation (3). If a failure directly leads to another one or if it is 
connected through an OR gate in which some other failures may exclusively cause the 
same failure also, we add the severity of the resulting failure to the severity of failure 
under consideration. If there is a connection through an AND gate where a 
combination of failures results in another one, we share the severity value of the 
resulting failure among contributing failures. In other words, we add the severity of 
resulting failure divided by the number of contributing failures to the severity of each 
contributing failure. For example, since F1 has the assigned severity value of 3, this is 
also assigned to the failures F6 or F8 that are connected through an OR logic to F1. In 
case of F7 and F9, the severity value is 4/2 because F8 has the severity value of 4 and 
it has an AND gate with 2 failure scenarios connected to it. A failure scenario can be 
connected to multiple gates and other failures in which the severity is derived as the 
sum of severities calculated for all these connections. 
 
Fig. 6. Fault Trees with the Severity Values 
7   Analysis of the Software Architecture 
In our example case, we defined a total of 44 failure scenarios including the scenarios 
presented in Table 4. We completed the definition process by deriving the 
corresponding fault tree set and calculating severity values as explained in Section 6. 
The results that were obtained during the definition process are utilized by the 
analysis process as described in the subsequent sub-sections. 
7.1   Architecture-Level Analysis 
The first step of the analysis process is the architecture-level analysis in which we 
pinpoint the sensitive points of the architecture with respect to reliability. As a 
primary and straightforward means of comparison, we consider the percentage of 
failures (PF) that are associated with the components. For each component c the value 
for PF is calculated as follows. 
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This means that simply the number of failures related to a component is divided by 
the total number of failures (in this case 44). The results are shown in Figure 7. A first 
analysis of this figure already shows that the Application Manager (AMR) and 
Teletext (TXT) components have to cope with a higher number of failures than the 
other components. 
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Fig. 7. Percentage of the Failure Scenarios Impacting the Components 
This analysis treats all failures equally. To take the severities of the failures into 
account we define the Weighted Percentage of Failures (WPF) as the following. 
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(5) 
For each component, we collect the set of failures associated with it and we add up 
their severity values. After averaging this value with respect to the all failures and 
calculating the percentage, we obtain the WPF value. The result of the analysis is 
shown in Figure 8. 
The weighted percentage presents different results compared to the previous one. 
Two components can be associated with the same amount of failures but these failures 
can have different severities. For example, AP and EPG have the same values in 
Figure 7 but EPG has a greater value than AP in Figure 8. Nevertheless, the 
Application Manager (AMR) and Teletext(TXT) components again appears to be the 
most critical. 
From the project perspective it is not always possible to focus on the total set of 
possible failures due to the time constraints and the cost of fault tolerance. To 
optimize the cost usually one would like to consider the failures that have the largest 
impact on the system. For this, in SARAH the architectural components are ordered in 
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Fig. 8. Percentage of the Failure Scenarios Impacting the Components 
ascending order with respect to their WPF values. The components are then 
categorized based on the proximity of their WPF values. Accordingly, components of 
the same group have WPF values that are close to each other. The results of this 
prioritization and grouping are provided in Table 6, which also shows the sum of the 
WPF values of the components for each group. Here we can see that, for example, 
group 4 consists of two components AMR and TXT. The reason for this is that their 
WPF values are the highest and close to each other. The sum of their WPF values is 
20+13=33%. 
Table 6.  Components Grouped Based on the WPF Values 
Group # Components WPF 
1 AC, CA, CH, GC, IC, PI, AD, G, LSMR, PMR, AO, T, VO 23% 
2 EPG, VC, VD, DDI, DM, VD, AP 27% 
3 CB, CMR 17% 
4 AMR, TXT 33% 
 
To highlight the difference in impact of the component groups we define a Pareto 
chart as presented in Figure 9. 
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Fig. 9. Pareto Chart Showing the Largest Impact of the Smallest Set of Components 
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In the Pareto chart, the component groups shown in Table 6 are ordered along the 
x-axis with respect to the number of components they include. The percentage of 
components that each group includes is depicted with bars. The y-axis on the left hand 
shows the percentage values from 0 to 100 and is used for scaling the percentages of 
the architectural components whereas the y-axis on the right hand side scales the WPF 
values. The plotted line represents the WPF value for each group. In the figure we 
can, for example, see that group 4 (consisting of two components) represents about 
8% of the components but has a WPF of 33%. Here, we group the components 
according to their WPF values and assign importance to these components according 
to the amount and severities of failures they are associated with (not according to their 
functionality or other aspects). The components with the highest WPF values are 
considered to be the most important ones to focus on. 
7.2   Component-Level Analysis 
The architectural level analysis provides only a quantitative analysis of the impact of 
failure scenarios on the given architecture. However, for failure management and 
recovery it is also necessary to define the type of failures that might occur in the 
identified sensitive components. This is analyzed in the component-level analysis in 
which the features of faults, errors and failures that impact the component are 
determined. For the example case, in the architectural-level analysis it appeared that 
components residing in the 4th group (see Table 6) had to deal with largest set of 
failure scenarios. Therefore, in the component-level analysis, we will focus on the 
members of this group, namely Application Manager and Teletext components. 
Following the derivation of the set of failure scenarios impacting the component, 
we group them in accordance with the features presented in Figure 4. This grouping 
results in the distribution of fault, error and failure categories of failure scenarios 
associated with the component.  
For example, the results obtained for the Application Manager and Teletext 
components are shown in Figure 10(a) and Figure 10(b), respectively. If we take a 
look at the fault features presented on those figures for instance, we see that most of 
the faults impacting the Application Manager Component are caused by the other 
components. On the other hand, Teletext Component has internal faults as much as 
faults stemming from the other components. As such, distribution of features reveals 
characteristics of faults, errors and failures associated with the individual components 
of the architecture. 
7.3   Failure Analysis Report 
SARAH defines a detailed description of the fault tree set, the failure scenarios, the 
architectural level analysis and the component level analysis. These are described in 
the failure analysis report that summarizes the previous analysis results and provides 
hints for recovery. Sections comprised by the failure analysis report are listed in  
Table 7, which are in accordance with the steps of SARAH. 
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(a) Fault, Error and Failure Features of the Failure Scenarios Associated with the Application 
Manager Component 
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(b) Fault, Error and Failure Features of the Failure Scenarios Associated with the  Teletext 
Component 
Fig. 10. Fault, Error and Failure Features of the Failure Scenarios Associated with the 
Components in the 4th Group of the Pareto Chart 
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Table 7.  Sections of the Failure Analysis Report 
Section # Heading 
1 Introduction 
2 Software Architecture 
3 Failure Domain Model 
4 Failure Scenarios 
5 Fault Tree Set 
6 Architecture Level Analysis 
7 Component Level Analysis 
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Fig. 11. Feature Distribution of Fault, Error and Failures for all Failure Scenarios 
The first section describes the project context, information sources and specific 
considerations (e.g. cost-effectiveness). The second section describes the software 
architecture that is used as an input for the analysis. The third section presents the 
failure domain model including the fault, error and failure features that are of interest 
to the project. The fourth section contains list of failure scenarios annotated based on 
this domain model. The fifth section depicts the fault tree set generated from the 
failure scenarios together with the severities assigned to each. The sixth and seventh 
sections include analysis results as presented in sections 7.1 and 7.2 of this paper. 
Additionally, the sixth section includes the distribution of fault, error and failure 
features for all failure scenarios as depicted in Figure 11. 
8   Related Work 
FMEA has been widely used in various industries such as automotive and aerospace. 
It has also been extended to make it applicable to the other domains or to achieve 
more analysis results. For instance, Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
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(FMECA) is a well-known method that is built upon FMEA. Additionally, FMECA 
[12] incorporates severity and probability assessments for faults. The probabilities of 
occurrence of faults (assumed to be known) are utilized together with the fault tree in 
order to calculate the probability that the system will fail. On the other hand, a 
severity is associated with every fault to distinguish them based on the cost of repair. 
Note that the severity definition in our method is different from the one that is 
employed by FMECA. We take a user-centric approach and define the severities for 
failures based on their impact on the user. 
Almost all reliability analysis techniques have primarily devised to analyze failures 
in hardware components. These techniques have been extended and adapted to be 
used for the analysis of software systems. For instance, in his book [15], Redmill 
shows how Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) can be applied to computer-
based systems. Application of FMEA to software has a long history [16]. Both FMEA 
and FTA have been employed for the analysis of software systems and named as 
Software Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (SFMEA) and Software Fault Tree 
Analysis (SFTA), respectively. In SFMEA, failure modes for software components 
are identified such as computational, logic and data I/O. This classification resembles 
the failure domain model of SARAH. However, SARAH separates fault, error and 
failure concepts and provides a more detailed categorization for each. Also, note that 
the failure domain model can vary depending on the project requirements and the 
system. In [11], SFTA is used for the safety verification of software. However, the 
analysis is applied at the source code level rather than the software architecture design 
level. It utilizes a set of failure-mode templates that outlines the failure modes of 
programming language elements like assignments and conditional statements. These 
templates are composed according to the control flow of the program to derive a fault 
tree for the whole software. 
In general, efforts for applying reliability analysis to software [10] mainly focus on 
the safety-critical systems, whose failure may have very serious consequences such as 
loss of human life and large-scale environmental damage. In our case, we focus on 
consumer electronics domain, where the systems are usually not safety-critical. 
FMEA has been used in other domains as well, where the methodology is adapted and 
extended accordingly. To use FMEA for analyzing the dependability of Web 
Services, new failure taxonomy, intrusions and various failure effects (data loss, 
financial loss, denial of service, etc.) are taken into account in [9]. Utilization of 
FMEA is also proposed in [22] for early robustness analysis of Web-based systems. 
The method is applied together with the Jacobson’s method [18], which identifies 
three types of objects in a system: 1) boundary objects that communicate with actors 
in a use-case, 2) entity objects that are objects from the domain and 3) control objects 
that serve as a glue between boundary objects and entity objects. In our method, we 
do not presume any specific decomposition of the software architecture and we do not 
categorize objects or components. However, we categorize failure scenarios based on 
the failure domain model and each failure scenario is associated with a component. 
Jacobson’s classification [18] is aligned with our failure domain model with 
respect to the propagation of failures (fault.source, failure.target). The target feature 
of failure, for instance, can be the user (i.e. actor) or the other components. In [20], a 
modular representation called Fault Propagation and Transformation Calculus (FPTC) 
is introduced. FPTC is used to specify the failure behavior of each component (i.e. 
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how a component introduces or transforms a failure type). This facilitates the 
automatic derivation of the propagation of the failures throughout the system. In our 
method, we represent the propagation of failure scenarios with fault trees. The 
semantics of the transformation is captured in the “type” tags of failure scenarios. 
In this work, we made use of spreadsheets that define the failure scenarios and 
automatically calculate the severity values in the fault trees (after initial assignment of 
the user-perceived failure severities). This is a straightforward calculation and as such 
we have not elaborated on this issue. On the other hand, there is a body of work 
focusing on tool-support for FMEA and FTA. In [9], for example, FMEA tables are 
being integrated with a web service deployment architecture so that they can be 
dynamically updated by the system. In [13], fault trees are synthesized automatically. 
Further, multiple failures are taken into account, where a failure mode can contribute 
to more than one system failure. The result of the fault tree synthesis is a network of 
interconnected fault trees, which is analogous to the fault tree set in our method. 
An advanced Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (AFMEA) is introduced in [8], 
which also focuses on the analysis at the early stages of design. However, the aim of 
this work is to enhance FMEA in terms of the number and range of failure modes 
captured. This is achieved by constructing a behavior model for the system. 
9   Conclusion 
FMEA and FTA are well known techniques that have been successfully applied in 
various domains like automotive and aerospace for reviewing the causes and effects 
of system failures systematically. In this paper we have utilized these techniques for 
early reliability analysis of software architectures.  It appears that the techniques can 
not be directly used as-is for analyzing reliability of software earlier in the life cycle 
and as such need to be extended. 
For the FMEA, we have utilized scenarios as the basic means to analyze the 
software architecture [5]. We have separated fault, error and failure concepts in a 
failure scenario as defined in the software reliability engineering domain [2]. We have 
provided a systematic means for deriving failure scenarios based on a failure domain 
model. For the analysis presented in this paper, we have also derived the fault, error 
and failure categorizations through domain analysis techniques [1]. 
For the FTA, we have introduced a quantitative impact model based on fault trees 
to estimate the impact of faults on the occurrence of a system failure. This model can 
be used to reason about how sensitive the system reliability is with respect to 
occurrence of a fault, even if the occurrence rates of faults are not known. 
Furthermore, we have distinguished and prioritize failures based on their effect (i.e. 
annoyance caused) on the user. We have incorporated this measure to our severity 
calculation. 
We have integrated the extended FMEA and FTA techniques with our software 
architecture reliability analysis method (SARAH) and illustrated their application for 
analyzing the reliability of the software architecture of a Digital TV. In our future 
work we will experiment with the method to identify the potential failures of 
embedded systems and as such improve their reliability.  
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